Opportunism and Agroindustrial Contracts: A Case Study in the Rice Market in the South of Brazil

Abstract

The article examines the presence of opportunism in agroindustrial contracts established between rural producers of rice and industries that benefit the product in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Starting from the concept of efficient governance, the aim was to understand and measure the opportunist behavior of the agents may, in the identified governance structures, manifest itself, given the principle of contractual incompleteness. According to the theory, in certain hybrid governance structures the contractual path would be a good solution for transaction costs. However, would agribusiness contracts be immune to opportunistic actions? From the methodological point of view, the study used mixed methods of investigation. In general terms, the agreements examined revealed a low occurrence of opportunistic behavior, a high degree of trust among the agents, and the co-specificities of evaluation and evidence that allow to protect the relation of opportunistic practice.